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5.1  Introduction 
It has been argued that the tremendous increase in collective bar- 
gaining among state and  local  government employees is largely  the 
result of the passage of  laws by states sanctioning and regulating the 
process of collective bargaining  by government employees.' In 1955 
less than a handful of  states had laws defining the collective bargaining 
rights  of public  employees and  virtually  all  of these prohibited  bar- 
gaining. By 1984 all but a few states had adopted a policy in this area, 
and only a handful of states prohibited bargaining.  Table 5.1 contains 
a breakdown of state laws governing the collective bargaining rights of 
public sector employees in  1955 and  1984 derived from the National 
Bureau of  Economic Research (NBER) public  sector bargaining  law 
data set (Valletta and Freeman this volume, appendix B). While there 
are serious problems of causal inference in concluding that the emer- 
gence of public policy caused the increase in unionization,  th,  ,=  emer- 
gence of public policy in this area along with public sector unionization 
represents an important puzzle for industrial relations scholars. If the 
public policy did cause the increase in unionization, then the problem 
is to explain the emergence of  the public policy. If unionization (or the 
pressure for unionization) resulted in public policy to deal with it, then 
the problem is to explain the emergence of the unionization. 
Henry S. Farber is professor of economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and a research associate of the National  Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gregory Leonard and Robin Maury provided research assistance. The author thanks 
John Abowd for very  helpful discussions and Robert Valletta for help with the NBER 
public sector bargaining law data set. Useful comments on an earlier draft were provided 
by Casey Ichniowski and Edward Lazear. 
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Table 5.1  Number of States with Laws Governing Collective Bargaining 
Rights 
1955"  1984 
No Law  Law  No Law  Law 
State Employees  44  4  8  42 
Police  45  3  8  42 
Teachers  45  3  3  47 
Source: Valletta and Freeman (this volume, appendix B). 
"There were only forty-eight states in 1955. 
The ideal would be to specify and estimate a full structural model 
of the determination of  public sector legislation and unionization that 
afforded the opportunity to determine the direction of causality directly. 
However, estimation  of such a model would  strain the limits of the 
available  data and econometric techniques. A  difficult, if  somewhat 
less ambitious, task is undertaken in this study: the specification and 
estimation of a reduced form model of the determination of state laws 
governing public  sector bargaining.2 The analysis is reduced  form in 
that the direct effect of public sector unionization on public policy is 
not analyzed, and it is argued that public policy is a function of the 
combined sets of factors that affect  public  policy  indirectly  through 
their effect on public  sector unionization as well  as the factors that 
affect public policy directly. 
The empirical analysis relies on the NBER public sector bargaining 
law data set (Valletta and Freeman, this volume, appendix B), which 
contains information  on each state's laws governing collective  bar- 
gaining  by  public  sector  employees for each year  in  the  1955-84 
period. Information is available separately for laws governing each of 
five classes of employees (state employees, local police, fire, teachers, 
and other local employees).  The analysis  here deals with  state em- 
ployees, police, and school teachers as groups that are representative 
of public employees more generally and capture the important vari- 
ation in  laws across employee  group^.^  While a number of different 
aspects of each law are summarized in the data (e.g., collective bar- 
gaining rights, union security provisions, policy  regarding strikes, al- 
ternative dispute settlement mechanisms), the analysis focuses on the 
fundamental  policy  regarding  collective  bargaining  rights.  This  can 
range from a prohibition on bargaining  to a requirement  that public 
sector employers bargain  with  their  employees. These data are de- 
scribed more fully in  section 5.2. 
In section 5.3 a model of the determination of the passage of legis- 
lation governing public sector collective bargaining is developed. This 
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1) whether or not to enact a law governing public sector bargaining 
rights, 2) what type of policy to enact if a law is passed, 3) whether or 
not to change an existing policy, and 4) what type of policy to change 
to if a change is passed. The model is based on two central constructs: 
the first is intensity of preferences for or against public sector union- 
ization; the second is the cost (ease or difficulty) of enacting or changing 
public policy in this area. Essentially, it is argued that a state will enact 
a policy or change its existing policy if its preferences differ from the 
value of  the current policy (or no policy) by enough to outweigh the 
costs of the change. 
The econometric framework is outlined in  section 5.4.  A Markov 
model of  transitions from one category of law to another (or from no 
law to a particular type of  law) conditional on the initial category is 
specified. The  transition  probabilities  are derived  directly from the 
theoretical framework developed in section 5.3. 
An important part of the estimation of  the model is to identify the 
factors that influence the intensity  of  preferences  for public  sector 
unionization and the costs of  policy change. Section 5.5 contains de- 
scriptions of the explanatory variables used to measure variation in the 
costs associated with the legislative process. These include the number 
of  days the state legislature meets,  a measure of  general legislative 
activity, an indicator of whether or not the legislature and the gover- 
norship are controlled by the same party, and a time trend. Section 5.6 
contains descriptions of  the explanatory  variables  used  to measure 
variation in intensity of preferences. These include congressional vot- 
ing records on labor issues, private  sector unionization,  income per 
capita, the relative size of  the government sector, a time trend, and 
regional factors. The same set of  variables is argued to measure vari- 
ation in the value to a state of having no explicit policy. 
The empirical results are presented in section 5.7. The most impor- 
tant factors found to be influencing the intensity  of  preferences for 
public sector unionization are the congressional voting records, south- 
ern region, income per capita, and the size of the government sector. 
Nothing measured in this study is found to influence the costs of leg- 
islative change in a systematic fashion. Section 5.8 contains an inves- 
tigation of how well the model fits the data. It is found that the model 
can explain the overall distribution  of  laws at various points  in time 
rather well. However, the model is less successful in explaining which 
states have laws of  a particular kind at each point in time. In section 
5.9 the results are summarized, and it is concluded that the model of 
legislative change developed in this study has some explanatory power 
but that more work needs to be done in defining and measuring variables 
that affect the costs of legislative change and the preferences for public 
sector collective bargaining. 132  Henry S. Farber 
5.2  Description of  Bargaining Law Data 
The NBER public sector bargaining law data set, described in detail 
in appendix B of this volume, contains a record of the legislative history 
of each state’s policy regarding public sector collective bargaining. In 
constructing these data, a serious attempt was also made to incorporate 
policies toward public sector collective bargaining that originated from 
judicial decisions. However, because most existing policy in this area 
has a legislative foundation and because the measurement of judicially 
made policy is likely to be incomplete, the data can be thought of as 
representing a largely legislative hi~tory.~  On  this basis the analysis 
that follows is developed in terms of policy as being derived through 
a legislative process. 
Overall, these data represent the best available comprehensive source 
of quantitative information on policy regarding public sector collective 
bargaining. The data are compiled separately for laws covering the 
three employee groups focused on here: state employees, police, and 
school teachers, and for each group information is collected regarding 
public policy governing their collective bargaining rights. 
Since it is not possible to characterize parsimoniously the specifics 
of every law with respect to collective bargaining rights, the laws are 
categorized  with regard to their general content. Four types of  laws 
are defined, ranging from the least favorable for bargaining to the most 
favorable. The categories are defined in table 5.2. In the least favorable 
category, bargaining is prohibited, while in the most favorable category 
the employer is obligated to bargain with the union. In the two inter- 
mediate categories bargaining is more-or-less optional. 
The evolution of laws governing collective bargaining rights of public 
sector employees is quite dramatic. Table 5.3 contains a breakdown of 
laws governing collective bargaining rights by state for each of the three 
employee groups in 1955 and 1984. It is clear that in the mid-1950s very 
few states had any policy at all regarding collective bargaining rights 
for public sector employees, and the laws in those states that did have 
a policy were not favorable to collective bargaining. By  1984 the large 
majority of states had adopted a policy, and these policies were largely 
Table 5.2  Categories of Laws Governing Collective Bargaining Rights 
Type  Definition 
0  No legislative policy 




Employer permitted but not obligated to negotiate with union 
Union has right to present proposals and/or meet with employer 
Employer has duty to bargain with union 133  Evolution of  Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
Table 5.3  Breakdown of Laws Governing Collective Bargaining Rights by 
Categorya 
State Employees  Police  Teachers 
Type of Law  I955  I984  1955  1984  1955  1984 
No Law  44  8  45  8  45  3 
1  3  8  2  4  2  4 
2  1  6  1  9  I  12 
3  0  4  0  2  0  1 
4  0  24  0  27  0  30 
Source: Valletta and Freeman (this volume, appendix B). 
aThere were only forty-eight  states in  1955.  See table 5.2  for law category definitions. 
favorable to collective bargaining.  For all three employee groups, ap- 
proximately half of the fifty states had adopted a policy of requiring 
employers to bargain  with  their employees’ unions. While  the fre- 
quency distributions of type of policy in  1984 are relatively close for 
the three employee groups, public policy  is more favorable for bar- 
gaining, on average, for teachers than for the other two groups, and 
somewhat more favorable for police than for state employees. In 1984 
more states had laws requiring bargaining and fewer laws prohibiting 
bargaining  with teachers than with the other two groups. Similarly, 
more states had laws requiring bargaining with police than with state 
employees. 
If we consider each year in a given state to be an opportunity for 
the state to modify its public  policy,  then  there are a total  of  1,490 
observations on the evolutionary  process for each of the three employee 
 group^.^ Table 5.4 contains breakdowns of these processes in the form 
of cross-tabulations by employee group of the current year’s legislative 
category by the previous year’s legislative category. What is obvious 
is that for all groups most of the 1,490 observations are on  the diagonals, 
meaning that there is generally no change in policy. In fact, of the 1,490 
opportunities to change policy,  changes occurred only  52 times for 
state employees, 52 times for police, and 61 times for teachers. 
Of the 52 changes in policy regarding state employees, 39 of these 
were initial enactments of a policy, 6 of which prohibited bargaining. 
Of the 13 changes in an existing policy, all involved a change to a more 
favorable law.6 Of the 52 changes in policy regarding police, 40 of these 
were initial enactments of a policy, 4 of which prohibited bargaining. 
Of the 12 changes in an existing policy, all but one involved a change 
to  a more favorable law. Of the 61 changes in policy regarding teachers, 
45 of these were initial enactments of a policy, 3 of which prohibited 
bargaining. Of the 16 changes in an existing policy, all but 2 involved 
a change to a more favorable law. 134  Henry S. Farber 
Table 5.4  Cross-Tabulation of  Current Collective Bargaining Policy by 
Previous Year’s Policys 
Current Policy 
Lagged 
Policy  0  I  2  3  4 
A.  State Employees 
0  748  6  13  8  12 
1  0  I69  0  0  1 
2  0  0  127  1  6 
3  0  0  0  96  5 
4  0  0  0  0  298 
B. Police 
742  4  14  5  17 
0  89  1  0  2 
0  1  191  0  5 
0  0  0  47  3 
0  0  0  0  369 
C.  Teachers 
657  3  18  5  19 
0  89  2  0  1 
0  2  233  1  5 
0  0  0  50  5 
0  0  0  0  400 
“See table 5.2 for category definitions. 
Since most of the “action” is in the initial implementation of a public 
policy  regarding bargaining,  an important focus of the analysis is on 
the pattern of emergence of these policies, both across states and over 
time. There is also a significant amount of change to existing policy 
that must be accounted for. However, the dominant set of observations 
consists of  those where policy is unchanged, and the theoretical and 
empirical framework must be able to accommodate this fact. 
5.3  Theoretical Framework 
A simple model of the passage of legislation governing public sector 
collective bargaining relies on two factors. First, the intensity of pref- 
erences for or against public  sector unionism is an important deter- 
minant both of the passage of any law and the particular type of law 
passed. Where preferences in a state are very favorable toward union- 
ization,  the state will be more likely to have a pro-union bargaining 
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unions, the state will be more likely to have an anti-union bargaining 
law. The second factor is the difficulty of passing legislation indepen- 
dent of  the intensity of  preferences for or against unionization.  This 
difficulty level is termed the costs of enacting legislation, and it is argued 
to be largely a function of the structure of the legislative process. A 
key feature of the model is the independent nature of the intensity and 
the costs. Any factors that affect the difficulty of passing legislation in 
a way that is related to intensity are subsumed in the intensity mea~ure.~ 
Suppose that a law governing the collective bargaining rights of public 
sector employees can be characterized along a single dimension and 
that the optimal value of a law (intensity of preference) in this dimension 
is denoted by Ri, in  state  i and year t. A higher value for R, denotes 
preferences that are more favorable toward bargaining. Suppose further 
that a loss function, Lir,  with regard to collective bargaining policy can 
be defined simply as the absolute value of  the deviation of the value, 
V, of the current policy,j, from the optimal value R;,. This loss function 
is 
(1) 
If it was costless to enact a policy or change an existing policy, then 
in each period each state would minimize Lit by choosingj such that 
Vj = R,.  In  other words,  the policy  each  period  would  reflect the 
currently optimal policy. However, it is generally costly to introduce 
a new policy or to change an existing policy due to friction  in  the 
political process. 
Consider first the case where a state has no policy in place.  How 
will that state decide whether to introduce a policy or to remain without 
a policy? Denote the value of no policy by VOir,  so that the loss function 
evaluated at no policy is simply 
L, = IR;, - Vjl. 
(2)  Lit.0 1  IRit  - Voitl* 
If the cost of introducing a policy is C;,,  then the state will find it optimal 
to introduce a policy only if the loss from introducing the law (Ci,)  is 
smaller than the benefit derived from elimination of  the loss from no 
policy. This condition is 
(3)  IRi, - VOitl  > Ci, 2 
assuming that the state is able to introduce a policy that has a zero 
loss associated with it (V,  = Ri,).8 
Note that this formulation does not impose a particular value to “no 
policy” relative to the actual policies. The value of no policy has state 
and time subscripts because there is generally a defucto policy implicit 
in no official policy that is likely to be state specific and change over 
time. For example, no official policy in a generally pro-union state will 136  Henry S. Farber 
have a different value than no official policy in a generally anti-union 
state. 
The available data group the laws into the discrete categories defined 
in  table 5.2. In order to derive the decision rules for states that have 
an existing policy, define Vj  as the value of a law in categoryj. Given 
the definition of the four categories (excluding no policy) in table 5.2, 
it is natural to assume that  V,  < Vz < V3  < V,. 
Once a state has a policy in place, it is assumed that this policy can 
be maintained costlessly, but that a change in policy entails incurring 
some level of cost, Cir,  that is independent of  the particular policy in 
place.  In this case a state will decide to change its old policy if  and 
only if  the loss associated with the current policy is greater than the 
loss associated with the best alternative policy plus the cost of change. 
It is further assumed that a state cannot retreat to having no explicit 
policy regarding public sector collective bargaining once a policy is 
ena~ted.~ 
Using the  same notation  as above, a state with  a category  1 law 
(prohibiting bargaining) will want to change that law if 
(4)  R,  K, + C,. 
where K, = (V, + V,)/2.  The value K,  can be interpreted as the point 
of indifference (in R)  between category 1 and category 2, and as long 
as preferences exceed this indifference point by enough to outweigh 
the cost of the change, then the state will change its policy. It is not 
necessarily true that the state will adopt policy 2 if this condition holds. 
This condition is simply necessary and sufficient for the state to desire 
a change to one of the other (higher) categories. 
The conditions to move from each of the policy categories are derived 
similarly and are: 
(5)  Start with #I:  R;, > K, + C, , 
Start with #2:  R, < K, - C, or Ri, > K, + C, , 
Start with #3:  Ri, < Kz - Ci,  or R, > K3 + C, ,  and 
Start with #4: Ri, < K3 - Ci,  , 
where 
(6)  K, = (V, + VJ2, 
K, = (V, + V3)/2,  and 
K3 = (V3 + V4)/2. 
If  the appropriate  inequality  conditional  on the initial policy is not 
satisfied, then the state will retain its existing policy. If the appropriate 137  Evolution of Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
inequality is satisfied so that the state decides to change its policy, the 
state will move to the category that yields the lowest value for the loss 
function. 
Given, that a state decides to enact a new policy or to change its 
existing policy, the state will use a similar decision rule in selecting the 
optimal category of  law. The loss function is minimized by  selecting 
the category of law whose value is closest to R,.  The category of law 
that minimizes the loss function is defined by the interval on the real 
line delimited by the K,  that R, falls in. For example, the lowest value 
law (category  1) will be chosen if Ri, < K1,  where K, = (V, + V,)/2. 
Similarly,  they  will  choose  category  2  if  K, < R,  < K,,  where 
K, = (V, + VJ2. The complete set of conditions is 
(7)  Choose 1 if R, < K,, 
Choose 2 if  K1  < R,  < K2, 
Choose 3 if  K2 < Ri, < K3,  and 
Choose 4  if  R,  > K3, 
where the breakpoints are defined in equation (6). 
There are two key features of this model from the standpoint of the 
empirical analysis carried out in succeeding sections. First is that the 
model allows the central construct of intensity of  preferences (RJ to 
affect three important elements of  the evolution of  public policy re- 
garding collective bargaining in the public sector:  1) the process that 
determines  whether a state  has  a policy  at all,  2) the process  that 
determines whether the state adjusts its law to reflect current condi- 
tions, and 3) the particular kind of  law that is adopted in an ordered 
response  context. The  second key feature of  the  model  is that the 
central  construct  of  costs of  adjustment  (CJ makes it  possible  for 
changes in policy to be relatively rare events. This is because the costs 
of policy change will provide a disincentive to change policy in response 
to small changes in preferences. 
5.4  Econometric Specification 
The basic approach taken to the econometric specification is to as- 
sume that there are 1,490 (48 states x 30 years + 2 states x  25 years) 
observations for each employee group on the current state of  policy 
regarding public sector collective bargaining rights conditional on the 
policy that prevailed at the end of the previous year. Thus, the prob- 
abilities of having a particular policy in a given state-year are specified 
conditional on the previous policy, and these probabilities are used to 
form a likelihood function that is maximized with respect to a set of 138  Henry S.  Farber 
underlying parameters  that are common to the various  conditioning 
events. 
The econometric framework used for this task is an extension of a 
standard ordered probit model. Conditional on the previous policy (or 
no policy), the specification will indicate the probability of the joint 
event of  1) change or no change in  that policy and 2) choice of  the 
particular policy that was implemented where there was a change. This 
is essentially a Markov model of  the transition probabilities based on 
the frequencies in table 5.4. The contribution of the theory is that it 
provides a way to specify each of the transition probabilities in this 
matrix as a function of  the same set of underlying parameters and in 
terms of a coherent model. 
Equations ($0)  define the decision rules that determine whether 
or not a state will enact or change policy and what sort of policy will 
be enacted if there is a change. These depend on the values of the cost 
of changing policy (Cjt),  the intensity of preference (I?;,), the value of 
no policy (Voir),  and the threshold values (Kl,  KZ,  and K3). 
The cost of changing policy (C,) is a fundamentally unmeasurable 
quantity that is modeled empirically as the latent variable YI  for a given 
observation wherelo 
(8)  YI  = x,p,  + El. 
The vector X,  represents observable variables that affect the cost of 
policy change; p1  is a vector of  parameters; and el is a random com- 
ponent. Similarly, intensity of preferences (R,)  is a fundamentally unob- 
servable quantity that is modeled empirically as the latent variable  Y2 
for a given observation where 
(9)  Y2  = x*p,  + €2. 
The vector X2  represents observable variables that affect the intensity 
of preferences; p2  is a vector of parameters; and e2 is a random com- 
ponent. A third underlying construct is the value of  no policy (Vojr). 
This is specified simply as 
(10)  y3  = X3P3  > 
where the vector X3 represents  observable variables  that  affect the 
value of  no policy, and p3  is a vector of parameters. There is no sto- 
chastic element in this construct. 
The particular  variables  in the X  vectors are discussed in  section 
5.5.  It is assumed that  and e2 have independent standard normal 
distributions. Given the qualitative nature of  the outcomes, it is not 
possible to identify the variances  or e2  together with the scale of  PI, 
p2, and p3. Thus, the variances are normalized to one. The means of 
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factors are subsumed in the constant terms in XIPI,  X2P2,  and X3P3. 
The zero correlation restriction is imposed for analytical convenience, 
but  it  is  consistent  with  the argument made  in  section 5.3 that the 
factors affecting intensity  of  preferences and costs of policy change 
are independent by construction. 
Given these specifications for the costs of policy change, the intensity 
of preferences, and the value of no policy, along with the model outlined 
in the previous section, it is possible to write the probabilities of all 
possible outcomes for each of the conditioning sets (initial policies). 
Let J, represent the type of law in place in state i in year t. The index 
J,  can take on any of the five values 0, 1, 2, 3,  4, where 0 represents 
no policy and  1 through 4  represent the four categories of  collective 
bargaining rights law described in table 5.2. These are the five condi- 
tioning events that define the five rows of the Markov transition matrix. 
The transition probabilities are defined as 
(1 1)  P,,,  = Pr(J, = nlJ,-, = m)  for n, m  =  1  . . . 5, 
where P,,,  represents the probability that a state with law category m 
in year t - I  has law category n in year t. These probabilities sum to 
one for each conditioning event such that 
(12) 
4 
C P,,,  = 1  Vm  = 0, 1,  2, 3, 4. 
n=O 
The various P,,,  depend on the same set of parameters and are defined 
in detail in this chapter’s appendix.]I 
It  is  straightforward  to formulate the likelihood function for this 
model based on the probabilities for the various events outlined in this 
section and presented in the appendix. The associated log-likelihood 
function is 
where Zmni, is an indicator variable that equals one if  state i had law m 
in  year t - 1  and law n in year t. The variable Zmrli, equals zero oth- 
erwise.  l2 Computation of this likelihood function involves evaluation 
of nothing more complex than bivariate normal cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs), and these are readily computable using numerical 
approximations. The empirical analysis  consists of  maximization of 
this likelihood function with respect to the free parameters of the model 
One shortcoming of the Markov approach used here and implicit in 
the likelihood function is that it assumes there is no correlation across 
time and within states in  the errors  and c2. It is certainly likely to 
(PI, P2, P3, K1, K2, and K3). 140  Henry S. Farber 
be  true that there are persistent  unmeasured factors that  affect the 
intensity of preferences and the costs of policy change within states. 
However, the appropriate technique for dealing with this problem is 
not clear. A fixed effect estimator, which includes a separate intercept 
for each state (perhaps in Y,, Y2,  and  Y3)  imposes too high a compu- 
tational burden in a nonlinear model such as this.  It also strains the 
limits of the information in  the data. There are also difficult compu- 
tational problems in using a random effects estimator. 
While this section in conjunction with the appendix contains much 
tedious specification of probabilities, the overall structure of the two- 
equation model is clear. States will  change their policy if  their pref- 
erencekost structure changes so that a different policy is optimal net 
of the costs of the change. The policy that states will select if they do 
opt to change will be the option closet to their most preferred position. 
In the next two sections the observable variables that determine the 
cost of policy change, the intensity of preference, and the value of no 
policy are described. 
5.5  The Costs of a Change in Public Policy 
The costs of a change in  public policy is a construct designed to 
capture how difficult it is to make a legislative change in policy. An 
important  determinant of  this  is the  structural  makeup  of  the  state 
government. While it is unclear exactly what organizational or political 
factors lead to higher or lower difficulty in  implementing legislative 
change, three measures that are likely to reflect these underlying factors 
are used in this study. 
The first is the number of days the state legislature is in session. The 
argument is that a legislature in session more days has a greater chance 
of passing a given piece of legislation. In addition, a legislature that 
meets frequently is argued to exhibit more professionalism. It should 
also be noted that a number of states had legislative sessions only every 
other year  or had  only perfunctory  sessions every  other year  until 
recently.  It is clear that these states are unlikely to pass important 
legislation in the “off”  years, and a variable representing days in ses- 
sion will  capture this phenomenon. The measure of legislative days 
was not available for 1983 and 1984, and the 1982 figure for each state 
was used for these years. The mean and  standard deviation  of this 
variable and the others discussed in this and the next section are con- 
tained in table 5.5. 
The second variable used is the number of bills enacted by the state 
government (passed by  the legislature and signed by  the governor). 
The arguments used to justify this variable are similar to those for the 
number of days the legislature is in  session. The data on the number 141  Evolution of  Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
Table 5.5  Descriptions, Means, and Standard Deviations (s.d.) of 
Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Mean (s.d.)  Description 













Year  69.6 
(8.63) 
Legday  115.5 
(101.6) 
Nenact  494.4 
(494.1) 
Unified  0.622 
Fraction of votes by state's delegation to U.S. 
House of Representatives consistent with 
AFL-CIO approved position on issues of 
interest to organized labor. (Source: AFL-CIO 
Department of Legislation, Congressional 
Voting Records.) 
Fraction of private sector work force in state 
unionized. (Source: U.S. BLS, Directory of 
Union Membership, 1964-80,  See text for 
source prior to  1964 and after 1980.) 
=  1 if  southern census region. 
Real income per capita in state in thousands 
of  1967 dollars. (Source: U.S. Regional Data 
Bank, Data Resources, Inc.) 
Ratio of state and local government 
expenditures to total income. (Source: U.S. 
Regional Data Bank, Data Resources Inc.) 
Time trend has values equal to year 1955-84. 
Number of days stated legislature met. 
(Source: Book ofthe States, various years.) 
Number of legislative enactments by state 
government. (Source: Book of  the States, 
various years.) 
=  1  if  legislature and governorship controlled 
by same party. (Source: Book ofthe  States, 
various years.) 
of  enactments  were missing for a few observations,  and  values for 
these observations were imputed by interpolation from adjacent years.I3 
The final legislative structure variable used is a dummy variable that 
reflects whether or not the state legislature and the governorship are 
controlled by the same party. It is argued that where there is this unified 
control, the government will be able to achieve whatever it wants more 
easily. This could be favorable or unfavorable bargaining legislation.  14 
A time trend measured by  year is included in  the cost function in 
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in this area. One argument for such a change is that as the public sector 
grew over this period and/or as public sector workers became  more 
interested in unionization, the general pressure to articulate some pol- 
icy with regard to public sector collective bargaining grew. That the 
pressure is not particularly for a positive or a negative policy, but simply 
for some policy, suggests that this factor belongs in the cost equation 
where a negative coefficient would indicate an increase over time in 
the likelihood of a change in policy. 
5.6  Intensity of Preferences for Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
and the Value of No Policy 
Perhaps the most important factor that would influence a state with 
regard to policy toward collective bargaining by public sector employ- 
ees is the general attitude toward unions in the state. Three variables 
are used here to reflect these attitudes. The first is a measure of  the 
“liberalness”  on labor issues of the congressional  delegation of  the 
state. This is likely to be important to the extent that  1) legislators 
reflect the preferences of the voters in their states on labor issues and 
2) these voters elect state legislators who also reflect these same atti- 
tudes. The measure used is the “COPE score”  of  the congressional 
delegation of the state. The Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
and the legislative department of  the AFL-CIO  regularly tabulate the 
voting records of individual legislators on issues of interest to the labor 
movement. On each issue, the legislative department defines a “right” 
vote and a “wrong”  vote where, obviously, a right vote is favorable 
to unions and a wrong vote is unfavorable. The COPE score is cal- 
culated as the fraction of votes cast “right”  by members of the state’s 
delegation to the U.S. House of  Representatives.  l5 
The second measure of the state’s general attitude toward unions is 
the extent of private sector unionization in the state. This may be an 
important determinant of the intensity of preferences for public sector 
bargaining laws for at least two reasons.  First, where the extent  of 
unionization is high, there is also likely to be more general pro-union 
sentiment. Second, a strong union movement  may  be able to lobby 
more effectively for legislation it wants, and favorable public sector 
bargaining legislation is likely to fall into that category. It proved very 
difficult to find a consistent time series for unionization by state, and 
what is used is not entirely satisfactory. Available from the U.S.  Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) are state level figures on union membership 
for the even years from 1964 through 1980. These data were interpolated 
for the odd years to yield a consistent series for these seventeen years. 
While other series are available for selected years (e.g., Troy and She- 
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a basis consistent with the BLS data, so they were not used here. A 
series from  1955 through  1963 was derived using data from the BLS 
on the aggregate extent of  unionization for each year in conjunction 
with the state-level data available for 1964. Specifically, the interstate 
distribution of unionization was assumed to be the same over the 1955- 
63 period as it was in 1964. However, the level in each state was adjusted 
proportionally  so that  the  employment-weighted  average  extent  of 
unionization in each year from 1955 to 1963 agreed with the available 
annual aggregate BLS data. In other words, the  1964 state-level data 
were used to fix the relative unionization across states and the annual 
aggregate data were used to fix the overall level of unionization.  An 
analogous technique was used to derive state-level data for 1981-84 
using the  1980 relative unionization across states and the annual ag- 
gregate BLS data. 
The third measure of general attitudes toward unionization is a dummy 
variable for states that are in the south. While it is well known that 
unionization  is lower in  the south, there may  be  negative  attitudes 
regarding unions in the south that go beyond the lower extent of union- 
ization.  Evidence  is  provided  by  Farber  (1983,  1984) not  only  that 
workers in  the south are less interested in  unionization than workers 
outside that region but also that  workers in the south who do want 
union jobs are less likely to be able to find union jobs, perhaps for 
institutional reasons. He also finds that the existence of right-to-work 
laws in many states in the south does not account for this inability to 
find union jobs. 
Three other measures that may be related to the intensity of pref- 
erences for public sector unionization are also used. The first is the 
level of per capita income in  the state. Where per  capita income is 
higher, it may be that the citizenry demands more public services and 
values them more highly so that public employees have more power 
that they can use to create an environment favorable to unionization. 
Alternatively, the citizenry may view unionization of public employees 
as a normal good, so they create an environment favorable to public 
sector unionization where incomes are high. The precise measure used 
is real per capita income in  1967 dollars. 
The second measure is designed to reflect the size of the government 
sector. Where the government sector is larger, public sector employees 
are likely to have more power and influence that they can use to promote 
legislation favorable to public sector collective bargaining. The measure 
used is the ratio of state and local government expenditures to income 
in the state. 
The final measure used is a time trend measured by the year (1955- 
80). This measure is included to capture a secular increase in prefer- 
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reason for the implementation  of  many favorable public sector bar- 
gaining laws over this period is simply a secular improvement in public 
attitudes regarding public sector unionization and/or a secular increase 
in public employees’ demands for unionization. 
The value of no explicit policy toward public sector bargaining de- 
pends heavily on the underlying attitudes toward unionization in the 
state. For example, attempts to unionize by public sector employees 
in a state very hostile to collective bargaining are likely to meet with 
strong resistance from employers, the populace, and possibly the courts. 
The result is a de facto unfavorable public policy toward unionization. 
Similarly, attempts to unionize by public sector employees in a state 
that is sympathetic to collective bargaining are likely to meet with less 
resistance (and perhaps implicit acceptance) from employers, the pop- 
ulace, and the courts. The result is a de facto favorable public policy 
toward unionization.  On this basis, the same set of  variables argued 
to determine the intensity of preference for unionization are argued to 
determine the value of  no policy. 
5.7  Empirical Results 
The econometric specification derived in section 5.4 was estimated 
by maximum likelihood using the data from the NBER public sector 
bargaining law data set described in  section 5.2.16  The first panel of 
table 5.6 contains the definitions of three vectors of explanatory vari- 
ables that are used in the estimation: 1) Zl contains only a constant, 
2) 2, contains the full set of  five explanatory variables  described in 
section 5.5 for the cost of policy change, and 3) Z3  contains the full set 
of seven explanatory variables described in section 5.6 for the intensity 
of preference and the value of no policy. 
The second panel of table 5.6 contains a summary of  eight specifi- 
cations (various combinations of the Z’s) used to estimate the model 
for each  of  the three  employee groups.  The  first  specification is a 
baseline with only constants in the three vectors (cost of policy change, 
intensity of  preference, value of no policy). This model has a total of 
six parameters:  three  constants and  three breakpoints.  The  second 
specification is fully unconstrained in that the full set of  variables for 
each of the three vectors is included: 1) Z2  for the cost of policy change 
vector, 2) 2, for the intensity of preference vector, and 3) 2, for the 
value of no policy vector. This specification has a total of twenty-two 
parameters. The next three specifications in turn have only a constant 
in one of  the three vectors. The final three specifications have only a 
constant in two of the three vectors. 
The last panel in table 5.6 contains maximized log-likelihood values 
for each of  the eight specifications for each  of  the  three  employee 
groups. These are used to evaluate the various specifications. Table 5.6  Model Summary 
A. Vector Definitions" 
Constant  Constant  Constant 
Legday  COPE 
Nenact  Union 
Unified  South 
Year  InciPop 
Govexp/Inc 
B.  Model Specifcutions 
I  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Cost of Policy Change  ZI  z2  z2  z2  ZI  z2  ZI  ZI 
Intensity of Preference  ZI  z3  23  ZI  z3  ZI  23  ZI 
Value of No Policy  ZI  Z3  ZI  z3  z3  ZI  ZI  z3 
# of Parameters  6  22  16  16  18  10  12  12 
C.  Log-Likelihood Values 
Employee Group  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
State Employees  -  280.0  -  250.4  -  254.7  -  265.8  -  252.2  -  276.6  -  256.0  -  266.8 
Police  -272.7  -242.9  -247.1  -258.8  -243.6  -270.4  -247.4  -259.5 
Teachers  -316.3  -270.0  -281.5  -294.2  -273.5  -311.0  -284.1  -296.7 
5ee  table 5.5 for variable definitions. 146  Henry S. Farber 
Before comparing the different specifications, it is useful to examine 
the estimates of the unconstrained model (specification 2). 
The results are not encouraging with regard to the determinants of 
the cost of policy change. For state employees, (table 5.7A), none of 
the variables seem to affect the cost of policy change significantly in 
the hypothesized direction. Only the number of  bill enacted (Nenact) 
has a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels, and that has the wrong sign. The results are no better for police 
(table 5.7B) or teachers (table 5.7C). Again, none of the variables hy- 
pothesized to affect the cost of policy change have coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero in the appropriate direction. In addi- 
tion, the hypothesis that all  of  the coefficients in  the cost of  policy 
change vector except the constant term are zero cannot be rejected 
using a likelihood-ratio test at any reasonable level of significance for 
any of the three employee groups. These tests are based on compari- 
sons  of  the  log-likelihoods  for  specification  5  with  those  for 
specification 2.  The conclusion  is  that  the  set of  variables  used  to 
determine the cost of policy change is not appropriate for any of  the 
three employee groups. 
The intensity of preference function performs better. For state em- 
ployees, the COPE scores are significantly positively related to pref- 
erence while in  the  south  preferences  are  significantly lower.  It  is 
interesting that after controlling for the COPE scores and for South, 
the extent of private sector unionization is not a significant determinant 
of preference for public sector collective bargaining for sta.te employ- 
ees, and it  has  the wrong  sign. The value  of  per  capita  income  is 
marginally significantly positively related to preference, but the size of 
the government sector, as proxied by the ratio of  state and local gov- 
ernment expenditures to total income, is not significantly related. There 
is no significant time trend in preferences. The estimates of the deter- 
minants of intensity are similar but somewhat less well determined for 
police and teachers.  In all three cases the hypothesis that all of  the 
coefficients in the intensity of preference vector except the constant 
term are zero can be rejected using a likelihood-ratio test at any rea- 
sonable level of significance. These tests are based on comparisons of 
the log-likelihoods for specification 4 with those for specification 2. 
The conclusion is that the set of  variables used to determine the in- 
tensity of  preference has significant explanatory power for all three 
groups. 
The value of no policy function is not very well determined for any 
of the three employee groups. None of the estimated coefficients are 
significantly different from zero for any of the groups. For both state 
employees and police, the hypothesis that all of the coefficients in the 
value of no policy vector except the constant term are zero cannot 
be  rejected  using  a  likelihood-ratio  test  at  any  reasonable  level  of Table 5.7  Markov Model of Public Sector Bargaining Laws. 
A. State Employees 
Cost of  Policy  Intensity of  Value of 
Variable  Change  Variable  Preference  No Policy 
Constant  3.60  Constant 
(2.28) 
Legday  0.000298  COPE 
(0.00137) 
Nenact  0.000695  Union 
(0.000244) 
Unified  -0.324  South 
(0.237) 








-  4.95 
(3.80) 






-  0.0429 
(0.0598) 
-  7.54 
(4.31) 












Summary Stutistics  Breakpoints 




N  =  1,490  Kz  2.71 
x2 statistic  = 59.2”  K,  3.20 
B. Police 
Cost of Policy  Intensity of  Value of 
Variable  Change  Variable  Preference  No Policy 
Constant  2.87  Constant 
(I  .37) 
Legday  0.000686  COPE 
(0.00 1 43) 
Nenact  0.0001 12  Union 
(0.000254) 
Unified  0.0058 I  South 
(0.00232) 







(I  .63) 
-  3.36 
(5.36) 



















-  0.889 
-  0.54 I 
(0.12;1) 
Summary Stati.stic,.s  Bredpoints 
LLF =  -242.9  K1  1.35 
N  =  1,490  K2  2.53 
x2 statistic  = 59.2h  K,  2.77 
(0.502) 
(0.361) 
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Table 5.7  (continued) 
Cost of Policy  Intensity of  Value of 
Variable  Change  Variable  Preference  No Policy 
Constant  3.16  Constant 
(I .47) 
Legday  0.00252  COPE 
(O.OOl50) 
Nenact  0.00002  1 0  Union 
(0.000292) 
Unified  -0.0432  South 
(0.194) 




I  .47 
(5.08) 
I  .76 
(I  .29) 
-  1.29 
(3.94) 




I  .99 
(4.76) 
-  0.0  I74 
(0.0805, 
-  5.92 
(5.39) 












Summury Statistics  Breakpoints 
LLF =  -269.9  K, 1.09 
(0.44) 
N  =  1,490  K,  2.60 
(0.288) 
(0.307) 
x2  statistic  = 92.gh  K,  2.81 
aSee table 5.5 for definitions and summary statistics of  variables. Specification 2 is used 
from table 5.6. The numbers in  parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. 
hThe  x2 statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained model with constants 
only (six parameters). 
significance. However, for teachers this hypothesis can be rejected, 
suggesting that the value of no policy does vary systematically in the 
measured dimensions for teachers. These tests are based on compar- 
isons of the log-likelihoods for specification 3 with those for specifi- 
cation 2. The conclusion is that the set of variables used to determine 
the value of no policy has significant explanatory power only for teachers. 
Overall, the estimates in table 5.7 are not terribly encouraging with 
regard to the model. It is true that for all three employee groups the 
hypothesis that all parameters except the three constant terms and the 
three breakpoints  are zero (specification  1) can be  rejected  against 
specification 2 at conventional levels of significance using a likelihood 
ratio test.  However, as is clear from the above discussion, only the 
coefficients of the variables determining the intensity of preference are 
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the parameters of the cost of policy change function significantly dif- 
ferent from zero, and only for teachers are the parameters of the value 
of  no policy function significantly different from zero. 
It may be that the estimation of three vectors of parameters for each 
group is putting an excessive burden on the data. Using the likelihood 
values in  table 5.6  as a guide, more  parsimonious  specifications for 
each of the employee groups can be derived. For state employees and 
police a reasonable specification has only constants in the cost of policy 
change and value of no policy vectors but with the full set of parameters 
in  the intensity of preference vector. This is specification 7, and it is 
nested in  specifications 2, 3, and 5. Specification 7 cannot be rejected 
at conventional levels against any of these three alternatives for either 
state employees or police. For teachers a reasonable specification has 
only a constant in the cost of policy change vector but with the full set 
of parameters in the intensity of preference and the value of no policy 
vectors. This is specification 5,  and it is nested in  specification 2. As 
noted above, specification 5 cannot be rejected against specification 2 
at conventional levels for teachers. On this basis  the  discussion of 
results proceeds using as preferred specification 7 for state employees 
and police and specification 5 for teachers. 
Table 5.8A-B  contains estimates of specification 7 for state employ- 
ees and police. It is clear that the restrictions embodied in these spec- 
ifications improve the precision of  the parameter estimates considerably. 
For state employees (table 5.8A) the estimates suggest that intensity 
of preferences are significantly positively related  to the COPE score 
and negatively related  to being in  the  southern region.  In addition, 
intensity of preferences is marginally significantly positively related to 
per capita income and per capita government expenditures. The results 
are similar for police (table 5.8B). Intensity of preferences are signif- 
icantly positively related to the COPE score and marginally significantly 
negatively related to being in the southern region. In addition, intensity 
of preferences is significantly positively related  to per capita income 
and marginally significantly positively related to per capita government 
expenditures. 
Table 8C contains estimates of specification 5 for teachers, and the 
results are somewhat weaker with regard to specific parameters. The 
intensity of  preferences are marginally significantly positively related 
to the COPE score and significantly negatively related to being in the 
southern region. However, the coefficients of  per capita income and 
per capita government expenditures in the intensity of preference equa- 
tion are small relative to their standard errors. The value of no policy 
is significantly positively related to union status and significantly neg- 
atively related to being in the southern region. However, the remainder 
of the estimated coefficients are small relative to their standard errors. Table 5.8  Markov Model of  Public Sector Bargaining Laws* 
A.  Stutc, Emp1oyec.s 
Cost of Policy  Intensity of  Value of 
Variable  Change  Variable  Preference  No Policy 
Constant  3.41  Constant 
(0.186) 
Legday  -  COPE 
Nenact  -  Union 
Unified  -  South 














0.01  I6 
(0.0307) 
-0.821 
-  1.95 
(0.351) 
- 
Summury Statistics  Breukpoints 
LLF =  -256.0  K, 1.68 




x2 statistic  =  -48.0h  K,  2.90 
8.  Police 
Cost of  Policy  Intensity of  Value of 
Variable  Change  Variable  Preference  No Policy 
Constant  3.36  Constant 
(0.163) 
Legday  -  COPE 
Nenact  -  Union 
Unified  -  South 
Year  -  Inc/Pop 
Govexpilnc 
Year 




-  0.279 
(1 .43) 






-  0.00  I 04 
(0.0308) 
-  1.69 
(0.303) 
Sumrnury  Stutistics  Brenkpoints 
LLF =  -247.4  K, 1.31 
N  =  1,490  82  2.41 
x2 statistic  = 50.6h  K,  2.63 
(0.356) 
(0.270) 
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Table 5.8  (continued) 
C. Teachers 
Cost of Policy  Intensity of  Value of 
Variable  Change  Variable  Preference  No Policy 
Constant  3.23  Constant 
(0.151) 
Legday  -  COPE 
Nenact  -  Union 
Unified  -  South 











3.  I9 
(4.79) 
-  0.0  I92 
-  1.62 














-  0.0404 
-  0.894 
Summury Stutistics  Breakpoints 




N  =  1,490  Kz  2.51 
x2 statistic = 85.6b  K,  2.73 
"See table 5.5 for definitions and summary statistics of variables. Specification 7 (state 
employees and police) and specification 5 (teachers) are  used from table 5.6. The  numbers 
in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. 
bThe  x2  statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained model with constants 
only (six parameters). 
The estimates presented in this section do not provide strong support 
for the model. The cost of policy change, while it may be an important 
concept, is not measured adequately by  the variables used here. Sim- 
ilarly, variation in the value of no policy is not explained by the data. 
The only systematic relationships found are for the variables that de- 
termine the intensity of preference. In particular, states with high COPE 
scores and states outside the south have preferences that are more pro- 
bargaining. However, there is no evidence that state/years with a high 
level of private sector unionization, after controlling for COPE scores 
and the other measures, are significantly different in  their preference 
for public sector bargaining laws. There is weaker evidence that state/ 
years with higher levels of per capita income and per capita government 
expenditure are more favorably disposed toward public sector collec- 
tive bargaining. 152  Henry S. Farber 
5.8  How Well  Does the Model Fit the Data? 
At this point, it is important to ask how well the model fits the data. 
While there is no consensus on an appropriate test of goodness-of-fit 
in a model such as this, two related concepts are used. The first asks 
how well  the model can mimic the aggregate distribution of  laws by 
category at five-year intervals. The second asks how well the model 
can differentiate the states that have a given category of law from those 
that do not at five-year intervals. 
The parameter estimates for any given specification can be used to 
compute a predicted Markov transition  matrix for any state i in  any 
year t using the probabilities defined in the appendix: Denote this one- 
period  transition matrix  by  &?,  whose jkth element  is the  predicted 
probability that state i with law categoryj  in year t - 1 will have law 
category k in year  t. On this basis the estimated transition matrix for 
state i over a n-year period from 1955 to 1955 + n is 
55+n 
ein  =  &fjr  , 
r=s5 
where T  represents the matrix product. The average n-period transition 
matrix over m states is 
1  In 
m  ;=I  cn  = -  . c Cin  , 
where C represents the matrix sum. Thejkth element of  this matrix 
represents the average predicted probability that a state with category 
j law in  1954 will have category k law in year  1955 + n. 
The average transition matrix was computed for n  = 4, 9, 14, 19, 
24, 29  (corresponding to the years 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1979, and 
1984) for each of the three employee groups. The preferred specifica- 
tions were used for each of the employee groups. These are based on 
the estimates in  table 5.8 for state employees, police, and teachers. 
First-order approximations to the standard errors of the elements of 
these matrices were computed using the “delta method.”’’ 
The first row of the transition matrix, C,z,  contains the average prob- 
abilities that a state will have a law in each of  the categories in  year 
1955 + n conditional having no law in 1954. Since fewer than a handful 
of states had any explicit policy regarding public sector collective bar- 
gaining in 1954, it is appropriate to focus on this row of the matrix. If 
the model fits the data well, it ought to be true that at each of the five- 
year intervals these transition probabilities ought to closely reflect the 
actual distribution of laws at that point in time. The underlying con- 
ceptual experiment is to assume that there were no laws in 1954 in any 
state and to start the process of evolution  of  laws according to the 153  Evolution of Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
estimated Markov process. The interesting questions are: 1) the extent 
to which the estimated Markov process can explain the movements 
over time in the fraction of  states with a law in a given category, and 
2)  the extent to which by  1984 the cross-sectional distribution implied 
by the Markov process is similar to the actual distribution. The average 
estimated transition probabilities along with their asymptotic standard 
errors, as well as the actual distribution of  laws for the six selected 
years, are contained in table 5.9 for the three employee groups. The 
estimated probabilities sum to one by  now. 
It is clear from the actual distribution of laws for state employees 
(table 5.9A) that most of the action in the enactment of  laws was in 
the period from 1964 through 1979. This is indicated by the sharp rate 
of decline over this period in the proportion of states with no law. The 
predicted proportion with no law declined steadily from 1959 to 1984, 
but the model was not able to fully capture the steeper decline between 
1964 and 1979. The model consistently underpredicted the fraction of 
Table 5.9  Actual and Predicted Distribution of Laws by  Category.,  All Fifty 
States 
A. State Employees 













































































































































No Law  Category 1  Category 2  Category 3  Category 4 
0.896  0.0625  0.0208  0.0208  0.0 
0.848  0.0365  0.0523  0.0138  0.0495 
(0.0349)  (0.0180)  (0.0161)  (0.00737)  (0.0269) 
0.740  0.0600  0.140  0.0400  0.200 
0.689  0.0581  0.0994  0.0279  0.125 
(0.05 10)  (0.0270)  (0.0247)  (0.0131)  (0.0458) 
0.480  0.0800  0.200  0.0400  0.200 
0.519  0.0658  0.135  0.0410  0.238 
(0.051  I)  (0.0292)  (0.032 I)  (0.01  86)  (0.0530) 
0.260  0.0400  0. I60  0.0400  0.500 
0.362  0.0576  0.151  0.0487  0.381 
(0.0434)  (0.0249)  (0.0379)  (0.0227)  (0.0501) 
0.180  0.0600  0. I80  0.0400  0.540 
0.248  0.0465  0.150  0.0504  0.505 
(0.0412)  (0.0207)  (0.0407)  (0.0244)  (0.0533) 
0.160  0.0800  0.180  0.0400  0.540 
0.180  0.0397  0.  I46  0.0496  0.585 

















































(0.023  I) 
0.0600 
0.0544 































































(0.081  3) 
“Predicted probabilities based on estimates of specification 7 for state employees and 
police and specification 5 for teachers contained in table 5.8. The numbers in parentheses 
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states with category  I  laws (prohibiting bargaining) after 1964. Roughly 
speaking, the model predicted that this fraction remained constant at 
approximately 7.5 percent after 1964, while the actual distribution sta- 
bilized at approximately  15 percent after 1974. At the other extreme, 
the model did a slightly better job capturing the emergence of category 
4 laws (requiring bargaining). The observed fraction of states with this 
type of law increased dramatically from 0 percent in 1964 to 46 percent 
by 1979. The model did not predict quite so rapid an increase, but the 
predicted  probabilities of category 4  laws did increase more  rapidly 
over the 1964 to 1979 period  than either earlier or later.  The cross- 
sectional 1984 distribution differs somewhat  from the actual distribution 
in predicting too high a fraction with no law and too low a fraction with 
a category  1  law. 
Examination of the actual and predicted distribution of laws for police 
(table 5.9B) yields  similar conclusions to those for state employees, 
though the model does seem to fit somewhat better. The timing of the 
enactment of laws governing collective bargaining for police was con- 
centrated between 1964 and 1979, and the model was not able to pick 
this up as well as it might have. The model did a better job fitting the 
fairly constant low probability of having a category 1  law. The model 
was also able to capture a large  share of  the rapid  increase in  the 
introduction of category 4 laws between 1964 and 1979. The predicted 
cross-sectional  distribution for 1984  is quite close to the actual 1984 
distribution. 
Table 5.9C contains the actual and predicted distributions for laws 
governing teachers. The overall  pattern of  movement of  the actual 
distribution of laws over time is quite similar to the two other groups. 
The model fits the data relatively well with the exception (common to 
the other two groups) that the rapid decline between 1964 and 1979 in 
the fraction with no law is not fully captured by the model. However 
the relative  stability  in the fraction  with a category  1  law, the rapid 
increase in  the fraction with  a category  4  law,  and  the  1984 cross- 
sectional distribution are all captured quite closely. 
Overall, the model seems to do a reasonable job in explaining the 
aggregate distribution of  laws at given five-year intervals. A more dif- 
ficult task for the model is to predict which states have laws of a given 
type at any point in time. One way to examine the ability of the model 
to predict which states will have laws of a given type is to examine the 
average predicted probabilities that a state will have a law of a given 
type in a given year where the average is  taken only over states with 
a law ofthat type. For example, it is useful to examine the average 
predicted  probability for states that have a category  1  law in a given 
year that those states will, in fact, have a category 1  law. 
The average n-period transition  matrix required for this exercise is 
defined similarly to that in equation (15) as 156  Henry S. Farber 
where Snk  is the set of states with category  k  law in year 1955  + n, 
mnk  is the number of elements in Snk, and Cin  is defined in equation 
(14). The conceptual experiment is the same as that underlying table 
5.9 in the sense that it is assumed that no states have laws in 1954 and 
that the process of  evolution  of  laws is  governed by  the estimated 
Markov process. If the model predicted perfectly, then the estimated 
probability that a state with categoryj  law in fact has a categoryj  law 
would equal one. The estimated probability that the state has a law in 
any other category would equal zero. While there is no chance that 
the model will do this well, the interesting  question that can be an- 
swered by this analysis is whether the estimated probabilities for a state 
with a given category law are skewed toward the type of law that the 
state, in fact, has. 
Table 5.10 contains estimated transition  probabilities and standard 
errors for the three employee groups. The calculations are presented 
for the three selected  years  1964,  1974, and  1984 (corresponding  to 
n = 9, 19, 29). Three subsets of states in each year are used:  I) states 
with no law, 2) states with category  1 laws, and 3) states with category 
4 laws. The estimated probabilities sum to one by now. 
The estimates in tables 5.10A for laws governing state employees 
are not very encouraging. For states with no law, the estimated prob- 
ability that the state, in fact, has no law is substantially different from 
one even in  1964 and declines dramatically by  1984. Even worse, the 
estimated probabilities are virtually indistinguishable from those con- 
tained in table 5.9A computed using all fifty states. For states with type 
1 laws, the model does a bit better. The estimated probabilities are still 
dramatically  smaller than one, but they are substantially  larger than 
those contained in table 5.9A computed using all fifty states. For states 
with  type 4 laws, the estimated probabilities  are again  dramatically 
smaller than one, and they  are again  larger than those contained in 
table 5.9A computed using all fifty states. 
The results  contained in table 5.10B for laws governing police are 
qualitatively identical to those for laws governing state employees. The 
model does a poor job distinguishing  states that have no law, but it 
does a somewhat better job identifying states that have anti-bargaining 
or pro-bargaining laws. The estimates contained in table 5.10C suggest 
that the model performs even more poorly for laws governing teachers. 
The model can neither distinguish states that have no law, nor distin- 
guish states that have anti-bargaining or pro-bargaining laws. Basically, 
the probabilities  presented in  table 5.10C computed using  only  the 
states with specific categories of laws are not very different at all from 
the probabilities presented in table 5.9C computed using all fifty states. 157  Evolution of  Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
Table 5.10  Predicted Distribution of Laws by Category,P Sets of States with Selected 
Category Law 
A.  State Employees 



















States with No Law (category 0): 
0.704  0.0736  0.071  1  0.0573 
(0.0573)  (0.03  14)  (0.0225)  (0.0200) 
0.417  0.0994  0.102  0.101 
(0.0531)  (0.0414)  (0.0306)  (0.031  1) 
0.246  0.0751  0.108  0.118 
(0.0594)  (0.0374)  (0.035)  (0.0400) 
0.810  0. I66  0.0128  0.00507 
(0.0884)  (0.0933)  (0.0101)  (0.00490) 
0.623  0.194  0.0515  0.0371 
(0.0867)  (0.090  I )  (0  .O  199)  (0.0151) 
0.474  0.182  0.0826  0.0599 
(0.0956)  (0.0830)  (0.0303)  (0.03 14) 
States with Law Prohibiting Bargaining (category I): 
States with Law Requiring Burgaining  (category 4): 
-  -  -  - 
0.256  0.0344  0. I12  0.132 
(0.0524)  (0.0279)  (0.0383)  (0.0423) 
0. I05  0.0244  0.0781  0.1 I4 




















Year  No. of  States  No Law  Category I  Category 2  Category 3  Category 4 
1964  37 
I974  13 
I984  8 
1964  3 
I974  2 
I984  4 
1964  1 
1974  25 
1984  27 
States with No Law (category 0): 
0.697  0.0574  0.100  0.0274 
(0.0525)  (0.0268)  (0.0252)  (0.01  3  1) 
0.459  0.0921  0.145  0.0419 
(0.0520)  (0.0403)  (0.0347)  (0.0194) 
0.175  0.0462  0.150  0.0533 
(0.0482)  (0.0244)  (0.0458)  (0.0266) 
0.826  0. I I8  0.035  I  0.00528 
(0.0545)  (0.0623)  (0.0199)  (0.00456) 
0.667  0.186  0.0750  0.0126 
(0.0842)  (0.0844)  (0.0304)  (0.00831) 
0.464  0.128  0.158  0.0351 
(0.101)  (0.0597)  (0.0421)  (0.0197) 
States with Law Prohibiting Bargaining (category I): 
States with Law Requiring Bargaining (category 4): 
0.482  0.0159  0.159  0.0558 
(0.114)  (0.0140)  (0.0420)  (0.0260) 
0.260  0.0267  0.152  0.0547 
(0.0417)  (0.0135)  (0.0421)  (0.0260) 
0.113  0.0175  0.125  0.0468 
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Table 5.10  (continued) 
C.  Teuchers 
Year  No. of States  No Law  Category I  Category 2  Category 3  Category 4 
Stuto with No Luw (cutegory 0): 
1964  37  0.685  0.0473  0.131  0.0230  0.1 14 
1974  8  0.311  0. I09  0.214  0.043  0.323 
1984  3  0.0597  0.124  0.  I76  0.0374  0.603 
(0.0542)  (0.0233)  (0.0347)  (0.102)  (0.0385) 
(0.0508)  (0.0360)  (0.0476)  (0.02  10)  (0.0493) 
(0.0386)  (0.0684)  (0.0568)  (0.0219)  (0.0857) 
1964  3  0.783  0. I14  0.0796  0.00724  0.0160 
(0.0495)  (0.0523)  (0.0367)  (0.00594)  (0.0152) 
I974  2  0.482  0.203  0.213  0.0248  0.0774 
(0.0851)  (0.0686)  (0.0580)  (0.0155)  (0.042  I ) 
1984  4  0.0842  0.288  0.360  0.0482  0.220 
(0.0620)  (0.129)  (0.0735)  (0.028 I)  (0.115) 
I964  1  0.677  0.0170  0.157  0.0273  0.122 
1974  25  0.153  0.0173  0.193  0.0509  0.586 
1984  30  0.0173  0.0346  0.151  0.0380  0.759 
StUte5  with Luw Prohibiting Bargaining (cutegory I): 
States with Law Requiring Burgaining  (cutegory 4): 
(0.0797)  (0.0162)  (0.0466)  (0.0138)  (0.0502) 
(0.0375)  (0.0101)  (0.0546)  (0.0247)  (0.0670) 
(0.0143)  (0.0210)  (0.0480)  (0.0226)  (0.0713) 
"Predicted probabilities based on estimates of  specification 7 for state employees and  police 
and specification 5 for teachers contained in table 5.8. The numbers in parentheses are estimated 
asymptotic standard errors. 
5.9  Conclusions 
The character of both the parameter estimates presented in section 
5.7 and the estimated transition probabilities presented in section 5.8 
lead to the inescapable conclusion that the model, as estimated, does 
not adequately explain the evolution of public sector bargaining laws. 
However, the model was successful in some dimensions. A number of 
variables (COPE, South, Inc/Pop, Govexp/Inc) were found to be sys- 
tematically related to the intensity of preference for public sector col- 
lective bargaining. In addition, the model seems to perform adequately 
in explaining the aggregate distribution of bargaining laws at a point in 
time. It did particularly well explaining the 1984 cross section. 
On the negative side, virtually nothing was found that was system- 
atically related  to the cost of policy  change. Whether this is due to 
having chosen the wrong set of  variables to explain these costs or to 
the concept itself being misguided is difficult to know. However, one 
piece of evidence in support of the concept is that when the cost of 
policy change is estimated as a constant alone plus a stochastic term, 159  Evolution of  Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
the constant term is estimated to be significantly different from zero. 
Were  there no rigidity  in  policy  determination, the estimate of  this 
constant would be insignificantly different from zero. 
Another important negative for the model is its failure to be able to 
predict  which states (as opposed to how many) had  laws of  a given 
category in a given year. This is clearly a difficult test, but it is something 
of a litmus test of our ability to explain and predict policy change. 
Overall, the problem of modeling the evolution of public policy is a 
difficult one. The basic model developed here is a potentially  fruitful 
approach toward modeling the evolution of public  sector bargaining 
laws specifically and public policy more generally. At the same time, 
the results  are disappointing  with  regard  to the costs of  legislative 
change and the ability of the model to predict the dynamics of public 
policy in  a particular state. More work needs to be done in defining 
appropriate explanatory variables as well as in refining and testing the 
econometric structure. 
Appendix 
Specijication of  Transdon Probabilities 
In this appendix, the twenty-five  elements of the Markov transition 
matrix are defined. The four elements associated with movement from 
an existing policy to no policy are assumed to equal zero by definition. 
These are 
(All  PmO  = Pr(J,  = O/JtPl = m)  = 0 
The remaining twenty-one elements are described in the remainder of 
this appendix as functions of the latent variables defined in section 5.4. 
Vm  =  1, 2, 3, 4. 
Row  1: No Preexisting Policy (JfP,  = 0) 
In this case a state will remain without a policy if the absolute value 
of the deviation of the  intensity of preference from the value of no 
policy is less than the cost of change. In terms of the latent variables, 
the probability of this event is 
(A2)  Pr(J, = OJJ,-I  = 0) = Pv( -  Yl < Y, - Y3 < YI) 
= Pr(Y, +  Y2  - Y, > 0, Yz - Y3 - Y,  < 0) 
= Pr(-El  -  €2 < XIP, + X2P2 - X3P3, 
€2 -  €1  <XIPI -  X3P3 -  X2P2) 160  Henry S. Farber 
= Pr(-e1 -  €2 < XIP, -  X,P3  + XZPZ) 
*  PY(E2 -  El < XlPl - X,P,  - X,P*). 
This bivariate  normal probability reduces to the product of  two uni- 
variate normal CDF’s because the correlation of el + eZ and e2 - el 
is zero under the assumption of equal variances for el and ez. 
The detail of presentation of Pr(J, = 0IJ,- , = 0) is to illustrate how 
the elements of the specification are tied together. This level of detail 
will not be continued for all of the probabilities in this section. 
When a state with no policy enacts a law in  the most unfavorable 
category (I), it is known that the absolute value of the deviation of the 
intensity of preference from the value of no policy is greater than the 
cost of change and that intensity of preference is lower than the bottom 
threshold (Kl). The probability of this event is: 
(A3)  Pr(J, = llJr-l = 0) = Pr[(Yz - Y3 
< -  Y,  or Yz - Y3 > Yl),  Y2 < K,], 
which can be expressed as sums of  bivariate  normal CDFs that are 
easily approximated numerically. 
When a state with no policy enacts a law in an intermediate category 
m (2 or 3), it is known that the absolute value of the deviation of the 
intensity of  preference from the value of no policy is greater than the 
cost of  change  and  that  intensity  of  preference  is  bounded  by  the 
thresholds K,-,  and K,,,.  The probability of this event is: 
(A4)  Pr(J, = mlJ,_I = 0) 
= Pr[(Yz - Y, < -  Y,  or Y2 - Y3 > Y,),  K,n-l < Yz < Kml, 
for m  = 2, 3. Once again, this can be expressed in terms of sums of 
bivariate normal CDFs. 
Finally, when  a  state with  no policy  enacts a law  in  the  highest 
category (4), it is known that the absolute value of the deviation of the 
intensity of  preference from the value of no policy is greater than the 
cost of  change and that  intensity  of  preference  is greater  than  the 
threshold K3.  The probability of this event is: 
(A3  Pr(J, = 41J,-,  = 0) 
= Pr[(Y, - Y, < -  Y,  or Y2 - Y3 > Y,),  Yz > K3], 
which again can be expressed in terms of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Taken together these probabilities completely specify the likelihood 
of all possible events for the cases where no policy had existed. It is 
straightforward to demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The 
parameters of this specification include PI,  P2,  P,,  and the three thresh- 
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Row 2: A Preexisting Policy in the Lowest Category (Jf-  I  =  1) 
The first possibility is that no change in the law was made.  In this 
case it is known that the intensity of preference is not high enough to 
warrant a change. Specifically, it is known that the intensity of  pref- 
erence is  less than  the bottom threshold  plus  the cost of  making  a 
change. The probability of  this event is: 
(A61  Pr(J, =  IlJ,+, =  1)  = Pr(Y, < K, +  Y,) 
which is simply a univariate normal CDF. 
While it was relatively  rare (see table 5.4) for a state to change its 
policy from one that prohibited bargaining to a more favorable category, 
it did happen. If a state were to change its policy from one of prohibiting 
bargaining to an intermediate category, m, it would be known that the 
intensity of  preference exceeds the lower threshold (K,)  by more than 
the cost of change and that the intensity of preference  lies in the ap- 
propriate interval (between K,,,- , and K,,). The probability of this event 
is: 
(A7)  Pr(J, = mlJ,-, =  1)  =Pr(Y2 > K, +  Y,,  K,,-,  < Y2 < K,) 
=  -  €1  < KI  -  X*P, + XIPI), 
= Pr(Y, - Yz < -K,, K,  I  < Y2 < K,,), 
which can be expressed in terms of bivariate normal CDFs. 
The final possibility for a state with a policy of prohibiting bargaining 
is to enact a policy in the most favorable category (4, requiring bar- 
gaining). In this case, it would be known that the intensity of preference 
exceeds the lower threshold (K,)  by more than the cost of change and 
that the intensity of preference also exceeds the highest threshold (K3). 
The probability of  this event is: 
(A8) 
which can be expressed in terms of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Equations (A6)-(A8)  define the probabilities of all possible events 
for the case where there existed a policy in the lowest category. It is 
straightforward to demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The 
parameters of these probabilities include PI,  Pz, and the three thresh- 
olds K,,  K2,  and K3.  Note that these probabilities are not a function of 
P3, which determines the value of no policy. 
Row 3: Preexisting Policy in Category 2  (J,  - , = 2) 
The first possibility is that no change in the law was made. In this 
case it is known that the intensity of  preference is not high enough or 
low enough to warrant a change.  More specifically, it is known that 
Pr(J, = 41J,+, =  1)  = Pr(Y2 > K, +  Y,,  Y2 > K3) 
= Pr(Y, - Y2 < -K,, Yz > K3), 162  Henry S. Farber 
the intensity of preference is both greater than the lower threshold (K,) 
minus the cost of making a change and less than  K2  plus the cost of 
making a change. The probability of this event is: 
(A9)  Pr(J, = 2(J,-, = 2) = Pr(K1 - Yl  < Yz < Kz  +  Yl), 
which can be expressed as sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 
If a state were to change its policy from category  2 to the lowest 
category it would be known that the intensity of preference is less than 
the lower threshold by an amount at least as  large as  the cost of change. 
The probability of this event is: 
(A 10)  Pr(J, = llJ,-, = 2) = Pr(Y2 < K, - Yl), 
which is simply a univariate normal CDF. 
Movement from category 2 to category 3 occurs when the intensity 
of preference exceeds K,  by more than the cost of a policy change and 
the intensity of preference is in the interval from K2  to K,. The prob- 
ability of this event is: 
(All) 
which again can be computed from sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Finally, if  a state were to change its policy from category 2 to the 
highest category (4, requiring bargaining), it would be known that the 
intensity of preference exceeds K, by more than the cost of a policy 
change and that the intensity of preference is greater than the highest 
threshold (K3).  The probability of this event is: 
(A12)  Pr(J, = 41J,-, = 2)  = Pr(Y, > K2 +  YI, Y2 > K3), 
which can be computed from sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Equations (A9)-(A12)  define the probabilities of all possible events 
for the case where there existed a category 2 policy.  It is straightfor- 
ward to demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The param- 
eters of these probabilities include PI, P2, and the three thresholds K,, 
K,, and K3. 
Row 4: Preexisting Policy in Category 3 (J,-,) = 3) 
The first possibility  is that no change in the law was made. In this 
case it is known that the intensity of preference is not high enough or 
low enough to warrant a change. More specifically, it  is known that 
the intensity of preference  is both greater than K2  minus the cost of 
making a change and less than the upper threshold (K,)  plus the cost 
of making a change. The probability of this event is: 
Pr(J, = 31J,-,  = 2) = Pv(Y, > Kz +  YI, K, < Y, < K,), 
(A13)  Pr(J, = 31J,-,  = 3) 1  Pr(K2 - Yl  < Y2 < K, +  Y,), 
which can be expressed as sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 163  Evolution of  Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
If  a state were to change its policy from category 3 to the lowest 
category, it would be known that the intensity of preference is less than 
K, by an amount at least as large as the cost of change and that the 
intensity of preference is less than the lowest threshold. The probability 
of this event is: 
(A14)  Pu(J, =  lI.l-1  = 3) = Pr(Y2 < K, - Yl, Y2  < K,), 
which can be expressed as sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Movement from category 3 to category 2 occurs when the intensity 
of preference is less than K2  by an amount at least as large as the cost 
of  change, and the intensity of preference is greater than the lowest 
threshold. The probability of this event is: 
(A15)  Pr(J, = 21Jr-l  = 3) = Pr(Y2 < K, - YI, Y, > Kl), 
which again can be computed from sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Finally, if  a state were to change its policy from category 3 to the 
highest category (4, requiring bargaining), it would be known that the 
intensity of  preference exceeds K3 by  more than the cost of  a policy 
change. The probability of  this event is: 
(A 16)  Pv(J, = 41J,-, = 3)  = Pr(Y, > K3 +  Yl), 
which is a univariate normal CDF. 
Equations (A13)-(A16)  define the probabilities of all possible events 
for the case where there existed a category 3 policy. It is straightfor- 
ward to demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The param- 
eters of these probabilities include PI,  P,,  and the three thresholds K,, 
K,, and K3. 
Row 5: Preexisting Policy in the Highest Category (JIpI  = 4) 
Finally, consider the case where the state had a law requiring bar- 
gaining (category 4). While it is conceptually possible for a state to 
move to a less favorable policy (if intensity of preference becomes less 
than the highest threshold, K3,  by more than the cost of change), this 
was never observed for the three employee groups over the thirty-year 
period covered (see table 5.4). Nonetheless, the probabilities of these 
events will be required when the parameter estimates are used.to com- 
pute predicted legal status at various points in time. 
In the case where there is no change in  policy (all of the observed 
cases), it is known that the intensity of preference exceeds the highest 
threshold minus the cost of a policy change. This probability is: 
(A  17)  Pr(J, = 41J,-l  = 4) = Pr(Y2  > K, - Y,), 
which is a univariate normal CDF. 164  Henry S. Farber 
If  the policy  were to change to the lowest  category,  it  would  be 
known that the intensity of preference is less than the highest threshold 
minus the cost of  a policy change and that the intensity of  preference 
is less than the lowest threshold. The probability of this event is: 
(A18)  Pr(J, = llJ,-l = 4) = Pr(Y2 < K3 - Y,,  Y2 < KJ, 
which can be evaluated as a bivariate normal CDF. 
If  the policy were to change to category 2, it would be known that 
the intensity of preference is less than the highest threshold minus the 
cost of a policy change and that the intensity of preference lies between 
K,  and K2.  The probability of  this event is: 
(A19) 
which can be evaluated as sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Finally, if the policy were to change to category 3, it would be known 
that the intensity of preference is less than the highest threshold minus 
the cost of a policy change and the intensity of preference lies between 
K2  and K3.  The probability of this event is: 
(A20) 
which can be evaluated as sums of bivariate normal CDFs. 
Equations (A17)-(A20)  define the probabilities of all possible events 
for the case where there existed a category 4 policy.  It is straightfor- 
ward to demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The param- 
eters of these probabilities include PI,  P2, and the three thresholds K,, 
K2,  and K,. 
Pr(J, = 21J,-,  = 4) = Pr(Y, < K3 - YI,  KI  < Y2 < K2)  , 
Pr(J, = 31J,_, = 4)  = Pr(Y2 < K3 - YI,  K2 < Y2 < K3)  , 
Notes 
I. Freeman (1986) makes this argument directly in the context of an inter- 
esting survey of the growth of unionism in the public sector. See also the work 
of  Reid and Kurth (1983), Dalton (1982), Moore (1977), Ichniowski (this vol- 
ume, chap. I), and Lauer (1979). 
2.  Kochan  (1973), Faber  and  Martin (1979), and  Saltzman  (1985) present 
studies of the determinants of  public sector bargaining laws. 
3.  For example, both  police  and  fire fighters  are viewed  as critical  local 
government employees, and the public policy issues raised by unionization of 
these two groups are similar. 
4. Incomplete measurement  of judicially  based policy should be more of a 
problem in the early years prior to the passage of  legislation because, at that 
time, the courts could exercise discretion without reference to specific  legislation. 
5. There are not 30  Y  50  =  1,500 observations because Alaska and Hawaii 
did not become states  inti1 1959 and 1960. Thus, these states do not contribute 165  Evolution of Public Sector Bargaining Laws 
observations for the five-year period from 1955 to 1959, resulting in ten fewer 
observations. 
6. For state employees, only Florida first prohibited bargaining (category  1) 
then moved to a policy  requiring bargaining  (category  4).  For police,  only 
Nevada and Texas had such a reversal of policy.  For teachers, only Nevada 
had such a reversal of policy. 
7.  It is  clear that the empirical analysis of outcomes will  not support any 
other interpretation.  For example, anything that makes it  more likely that a 
favorable law is passed cannot be classified unambiguously as more favorable 
preferences  as opposed to lower costs of  passing favorable legislation.  The 
analogous argument can be made for unfavorable legislation. 
8. This is not a terribly realistic assumption, and it is not consistent with the 
empirical analysis that follows. However, it simplifies the analysis quite a bit 
without changing its fundamental nature. 
9. Such a retreat is never observed. 
10.The “it”  subscripts are suppressed in  this presentation, except where 
necessary for clarity, to keep the notation uncluttered. 
I  I. While the derivations of the probabilities are straightforward, they make 
rather tedious reading. The reader may find it useful to examine the derivation 
of a few of the probabilities in the appendix in order to be clear about their 
nature. 
12. The variable Zmni,  = 0 for all values of m and n  for Alaska and Hawaii 
prior to 1960. 
13. Data for 1955 and 1957 for New Jersey and for 1955 for New York were 
missing. 
14. There were nonpartisan elections in Nebraska for the entire period and 
in Minnesota for part of the period. Given the absence of a party structure, 
the concept of unified  control has little meaning, so the dummy variable was 
assigned a value of zero in these cases. 
15. The voting records were available only for congresses (pairs of years) 
from  1955 through  1958.  For these years, the two-year record is used. For 
example, the 1955-56  COPE score is used for both  1955 and 1956. 
16. The numerical optimization was carried out using the algorithm described 
by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). 
17. The standard error of an element of the transition matrix is computed 
as the square root of g’Vg, where g  is the gradient vector of the particular 
element of the matrix with respect to the parameter vector, and V is the es- 
timated asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimated parameters. The gra- 
dient vectors were computed numerically. 
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